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I Comments I
The King's Bench Power in Pennsyl-
vania: A Unique Power That Provides
Efficient Results
I. Introduction*
"The shadow of Rolf Larsen still haunts the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court."1 During the former justice's impeachment trial
in 1994, two possible abuses by the Court of the King's Bench
power2 were presented to the Pennsylvania Legislature's Impeach-
- Author's note: In an effort to assist the reader in obtaining the Pennsylvania
legislative documents cited in this comment, the Bluebook rules were supplemented with
those citations of common usage within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
1. King's Bench Isn't Broke, Court is, MORNING CALL (Allentown), Aug. 18, 1995, at
A18. Rolf Larsen is a former Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice who was found guilty on
one of seven counts of misconduct by the Pennsylvania Senate in 1994. He was the first
Pennsylvania judge convicted in an impeachment process since 1811. Larsen was
permanently removed from the bench and banned from state public office for life. Only two
other judges in Pennsylvania history have been convicted of wrongdoing and removed:
Thomas Cooper, president judge of Northumberland, Luzerne and Lycoming counties in
1811; and Judge Alexander Addison in 1803. See Jack Sherzer, Senate Convicts Larsen-Ex-
Justice Guilty on 1 of 7 Charges, PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg), Oct. 5, 1994, at Al.
2. King's Bench, in essence, is a mechanism which allows the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court to take complete jurisdiction over the proceedings and to decide a case of immediate
public importance without the normal lower court proceedings. Thus, litigants who
successfully invoke the King's Bench power receive a more expeditious resolution of their
disputes. See In re Ninth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 88 M.D. Misc. Dkt. 1992, 67
(Report, Oct. 22, 1993) [hereinafter Grand Jury Report].
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ment Trial Committee.3  Although the Attorney General investi-
gated and found no violation of the law,4 the Legislature ques-
tioned the legitimacy of the supreme court's use of the power.5
Now, plagued by public disdain for the commonwealth's highest
court,' the Pennsylvania Legislature believes it is time to restrict,
or possibly even repeal, this unique judicial authority that allows
the supreme court immediately to assume jurisdiction of cases
before lower courts.
7
Immediately following the Larsen impeachment hearings, the
Legislature, led by the House Judiciary Committee, drafted two
bills,8 House Bill 10' and House Bill 838.t° The originally stated
purpose of the bills was to "put our appellate judiciary's house in
order,"'" "restore the constitutional balance between the judiciary
and the legislature"' 2 and "make the judiciary more accountable
3. See In re: Impeachment Trial of Justice Rolf Larsen Before the Impeachment Trial
Comm., Vol. X, pp. 2113-2359 (Pa. Aug. 24, 1994) [hereinafter Impeachment Trial]
(testimony of the Hon. Stephen A. Zappala). See also discussion infra Part III.
4. See Grand Jury Report, supra note 2.
5. See Public Hearing on Judicial Reform- House Bills 10 and 838 Before the House
Judiciary Comm., York: Key Reporters, pp. 19-22 (Pa. Mar. 2, 1995) [hereinafter March
Hearing] (statement of Rep. Jeffrey E. Piccola, Chairperson).
6. See Public Hearing on King's Bench Authority of Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Before the House Judiciary Comm., York: Key Reporters, pp. 4-6 (Pa. Aug. 3, 1995)
[hereinafter August Hearing] (statement of Rep. Jeffrey E. Piccola, Chairperson); see also
Emilie Lounsberry, How Judges and Lawyers in Survey Rate Pa. Supreme Court Justices,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 15, 1995, at Al (survey finding lawyers and judges who are highly
familiar with Pennsylvania Supreme Court rate a majority of its justices as above average on
the law, but give justices low marks on political independence). The survey was conducted
to determine how the court is viewed within the state's legal community after two years of
controversy over the conduct of Justice Rolf Larsen.
7. See Rep. Jeffrey E. Piccola, Reigning in Court Necessary to Restore Balance,
PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg), Sept. 15,1995, at A15; see also Judicious Agenda-Piccola Eyes
Changes in Court Rules, Location While Reform Iron Remains Hot, PATRIOT-NEWS
(Harrisburg), Feb. 13, 1995, at A6.
8. The bills jointly provide for four major provisions: the elimination of the supreme
court's King's Bench power, the creation of a new Judicial Council, the selection of the Chief
Justice by the Governor, and the requirement that the seat be placed in Harrisburg. See
March Hearing, supra note 5, at 8-9 (statement of Rep. Jeffrey E. Piccola).
9. House Bill No. 10, Printer's No. 1958 (Pa. 1995) [hereinafter HB 10] (regarding a
proposed amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution with respect to judicial reform).
10. House Bill No. 838, Printer's No. 1959 (Pa. 1995) [hereinafter HB 838] (implement-
ing legislation to House Bill 10).
11. Meeting, Judicial Reform Before the House Judiciary Comm., (Pa. May 23, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Jeffrey E. Piccola, Chairperson).
12. March Hearing, supra note 5, at 7 (statement of Rep. Jeffrey E. Piccola,
Chairperson).
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to the clientele it ultimately serves, the citizens of Pennsylvania."' 3
These goals, however, are not met in the provision restricting, or
eliminating, the King's Bench power.
The Legislature has admitted that, although it thinks that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court "invokes the King's Bench Jurisdic-
tion in a haphazard and inscrutable way,"14 the legislative branch
"has seen nothing which [sic] would lead [it] to believe that the
supreme court has acted contrary to law." 5  Nevertheless, the
Legislature steadily continues to work toward a constitutional
amendment that would eliminate or severely restrict King's
Bench.1 6 If the amendment is adopted, Pennsylvania will lose a
unique power that expedites the legal decision-making process.
The Pennsylvania House of Representatives conducted several
hearings on the bills that revealed a variety of views on the need
for and use of the King's Bench power.'7 Through the hearings,
the House discovered that King's Bench is a rarely used power.
However, that power is highly effective for matters of concern to
the commonwealth. 8 Consequently, many in the legal profession
hesitate to remove this power and urge other reforms, such as merit
selection of judges,19 to restore confidence in Pennsylvania's
judicial system.
This comment argues that removal of the historical King's
Bench power will leave a void in Pennsylvania's judicial branch. It
explores the existing statute and the problems with the law,
provides a synopsis of the movement behind the removal of the
power, and reviews the substance of the originally introduced bills.
13. Id.
14. August Hearing, supra note 6, at 5 (statement of Rep. Jeffrey E. Piccola,
Chairperson).
15. Id.
16. See infra note 85 and accompanying text (reviewing the history of the originally
introduced House bills and the subsequently introduced Senate bills). On February 28, 1997,
Senator Piccola along with six other senators introduced legislation that "establish[es] the
Unified Judiciary Commission to study reform of the judiciary." Senate Bill No. 578,
Printer's No. 607 (Pa. 1997) (Commission's duties to include study of Pennsylvania's King's
Bench power).
17. The hearings were held March 2, 1995 and August 3, 1995. A committee meeting
was held on May 23, 1995. See supra notes 5, 6, 11.
18. See August Hearing, supra note 6, at 10-11 (testimony of Zygmont Pines, Chief
Counsel, Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts).
19. See March Hearing, supra note 5, at 96 (testimony of Hon. Robert L. Byer, retired
judge, Pa. Commw. Ct., representing Judicature Society); see also Rich Kirkpatrick, Merit
Selection Long Overdue, Judge Tells House Subcommittee, AP POLITICAL SERVICE, Aug. 30,
1995, available in 1995 WL 6739629.
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The problems with the bills as written, including the possible
impact such a removal could have on the future of the court system
in Pennsylvania, are also discussed. In addition, this comment
looks at other states and their appeal processes and recommends
procedures the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may implement in
order to provide a more accountable judicial system.
II. Existing Law and Its Problems
The King's Bench power' was granted to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in the Act of 1722.21 Historically,22 this power
was given to the supreme court to exercise the authority of the
King's Bench jurisdiction-a jurisdiction exercised by the judges of
the King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer at Westmin-
ster. 3 This power included the right to supervise and manage the
other courts.24
Since the 1722 Act, the Legislature has added and deleted
many judicial provisions. Among the changes are the number of
justices who sit on the bench, their qualifications, and their
tenure.' Throughout the commonwealth's 275 year history,
however, the King's Bench power has remained. 6 At the 1968
Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention, some delegates questioned
whether the power should be removed.27 Nevertheless, King's
20. The term "King's Bench" is a misnomer because Pennsylvania does not have a King
nor does the state have the three principal English courts of Westminster. For this reason,
many call this power "plenary" or "extraordinary" jurisdiction. August Hearing, supra note
6, at 8-9 (testimony of Zygmont Pines).
21. The justices shall "exercise the jurisdiction and powers hereby granted concerning
all and singular the premises according to law, as fully and amply, to all intents and purposes
whatsoever, as the Justices of the Court of King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer,
at Westminster, or any of them, may or can do." 1 SMITH LAWs 140 (1810).
The history of the power, however, dates back to the English common law tradition
in equity of the 1300's. The power allowed the second highest court in all of England to
summon before it any proceedings stemming from any lower court. See March Hearing,
supra note 5, at 14 (testimony of Paul Stevens, President, Pennsylvania Bar Association).
22. See Bernard F. Scherer, The Supreme Court of PA and the Origins of King's Bench
Power, 32 DuO. L. REV. 525 (1994) (providing an in-depth look at the historical view of this
power).
23. See 1 SMrrH LAWS 140 (1810).
24. See August Hearing, supra note 6, at 9 (testimony of Zygmont Pines).
25. See THE PENNSYLVANIA MANUAL 5-4 (Dep't of Gen. Servs. ed., 1995).
26. See id.
27. See DIV. OF DOCUMENTS, DEP'T OF PROPERTY & SUPPLIES, DEBATES OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967-1968, Vol. II, at 841-42 (1969)
[hereinafter DEBATES].
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Bench remained because the delegates believed that the power is
inherent and, therefore, cannot be removed.
28
Today, King's Bench can be found in both the Pennsylvania
Constitution and statutory law. Sections 2(a),29 10(a),3° and
10(c)31 of article V of the constitution designate the supreme court
as the highest court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with
power over all other courts. The statutory power for King's Bench,
or plenary jurisdiction, can be found in title 42 of the Pennsylvania
28. At the 1968 Constitutional Convention, Delegate Robert Woodside referred to the
King's Bench powers as an inherent jurisdiction, "powers, which, in effect, are the
Commonwealth powers .... August Hearing, supra note 6, at 10 (testimony of Zygmont
Pines). See also, DEBATES, supra note 27, at 841-42.
29. Article V, section 2(a) of the Pennsylvania Constitution states: "The Supreme Court
shall be the highest court of the Commonwealth and in this court shall be reposed the
supreme judicial power of the Commonwealth." PA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
30. Article V, section 10(a) states: "The Supreme Court shall exercise general
supervisory and administrative authority over all the courts and justices of the peace,
including authority to temporarily assign judges and justices of the peace from one court or
district to another as it deems appropriate." PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(a).
31. Article V, section 10(c) states:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules governing
practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts, justices of the peace and all
officers serving process or enforcing orders, judgments or decrees of any court
assignment and reassignment of classes of actions or classes of appeals among the
several courts as the needs of justice shall require, and for admission to the bar
and to practice law, and the administration of all courts and supervision of all
officers of the Judicial Branch, if such rules are consistent with this Constitution
and neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant, nor
affect the right of the General Assembly to determine the jurisdiction of any court
or justice of the peace, nor suspend nor alter any statute of limitation of repose.
All laws shall be suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent with rules
prescribed under these provisions.
PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c).
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Consolidated Statutes Annotated, sections 50232 and 726.3Y Case
law has helped to define the King's Bench power even further.34
Despite the Legislature's assertion that this power is used far
too often, from 1979 to 1994 the supreme court reviewed only
ninety-seven 35 cases under King's Bench, plenary or extraordinary
relief.36  The recent case of Thermal Pure v. DER37 and Justice
Larsen's accusations of Justice Zappala abusing the power,38
however, have caused some legislators and residents to question
whether the supreme court should have this power.39 Yet, before
32. Section 502, General powers of supreme court, states:
The Supreme Court shall have and exercise the powers vested in it by the
Constitution of Pennsylvania, including the power generally to minister justice to
all persons and to exercise the powers of the court, as fully and amply, to all
intents and purposes, as the justices of the Court of King's Bench, Common Pleas
and Exchequer, at Westminster, or any of them, could or might do on May 22,
1722. The Supreme Court shall also have and exercise the following powers:
(1) All powers necessary or appropriate in aid of its original and appellate
jurisdiction which are agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
(2) The powers vested in it by statutes, including the provisions of this title.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 502 (West 1981).
33. Section 726, Extraordinary jurisdiction, states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Supreme Court may, on its own
motion or upon petition of any party, in any matter pending before any court or
district justice of this Commonwealth involving an issue of immediate public
importance, assume plenary jurisdiction of such matter at any stage thereof and
enter a final order or otherwise cause right and justice be done.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 726 (West 1981).
34. See discussion infra Part IV.
35. The court has approximately 3,000 cases before it each year, which includes allocatur
cases. See August Hearing, supra note 6, at 12, 30 (testimony of Zygmont Pines).
36. The following categorization of cases was accepted and decided under plenary
jurisdiction from 1979 to 1994:
Civil Cases: Election cases: 5
Judicial Election cases: 12
Labor Cases: 6
Government related cases: 11
Other: 18
Criminal Cases: Grand Jury cases: 2
Other: 29
Media related cases: 4
Judicial Admin.: Funding cases: 4
Other: 6
See id.
37. 63 E.D. Misc. Dkt. 1995 (Pa.); see also Chester Residents Concerned for Quality
Living v. DER, 668 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1995). For a discussion of the background on this case,
see generally infra Part Ill.
38. See Impeachment Trial, supra note 3.
39. See August Hearing, supra note 6, at 5-6.
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any final decisions are made to remove the King's Bench power, it
is necessary to understand how the judicial and legislative branches,
as well as the vocal opponents and proponents, view the power.
A. Supreme Court's View of the Power
Justice Zappala explained the modem day understanding of
the jurisdiction of King's Bench during the Larsen hearings. He
described the jurisdiction as "broad" and stated that the power was
designed to "resolve the issue and dispose of it."'  Case law
endorses Justice Zappala's beliefs and further shows that the
supreme court believes King's Bench is based in the Pennsylvania
Constitution.4
The court has stated that Pennsylvania's Constitution grants
power to the supreme court "to prescribe general rules governing
practice procedure and the conduct of all courts."4 2 Furthermore,
the court has interpreted section 10(c) to mean that:
40. Impeachment Trial, supra note 3. Justice Zappala stated:
Well, King's Bench jurisdiction, there's two, essentially. There's King's Bench, and
you also have plenary, both by statute. King's Bench is regarded more as the
much broader, and it came from the old common law days where you are the
king's court and you could do no wrong and whatever the king wants you to do,
you go and do it. It's almost an absolute power that the court has in order to
protect, quote, the fiefdom-or the crown. And it's never been altered or
changed, either by Constitution or statute. Interestingly, they then supplemented
that with the plenary powers of the court to reach in at any given time because of
necessity, and so forth, so that a petitioner could come by either way, King's
Bench or by plenary jurisdiction. Both of them are not-are rarely used except
in extraordinary times. But both give the court the ability, if they deem it
appropriate, to move where necessary to cure something which has been caused
by some wrong. That's as simple as I can put it.
Q. Is there any major difference between a King's Bench case or a plenary
jurisdiction case?
A. There essentially, with a King's Bench says you can do basically almost
anything, and that's pretty wild. Whereas plenary, you have to take it on the
position that there is a case or controversy at issue, so that there is something
pending within your court system, one more or less has to have an overlay of what
we call jurisdiction, there has to be something there for you to reach down and
take it. Whereas the King's Bench says just go grab what you want, bring it up,
do what you have to do, resolve the issue and dispose of it.
Impeachment Trial, supra note 3, at 2163-64 (testimony of Hon. Stephen A. Zappala).
41. See In re 42 PA. C.S. § 1703, 394 A.2d 444, 447 (Pa. 1978), leave to file petition for
mandamus denied sub nom. Kubert v. Supreme Ct. of Commonwealth of Pa., 440 U.S. 905
(1979).
42. Id. at 447 (citing PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c)).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
All laws shall be suspended to the extent that they are inconsis-
tent with rules prescribed under [this] provision . . . . The
jurisdiction of the King's Bench encompasses the inherent
power of removing by certiorari the record and proceedings of
any criminal case from the inferior courts at any stage of the
proceedings.43
Due to the court's strong words, legal scholars and practicing
attorneys believe that if the Legislature enacts legislation removing
or restricting King's Bench through the Judicial Code without a
constitutional amendment, the supreme court will declare the
legislation unconstitutional."
Furthermore, any constitutional amendment will need to be
worded strongly, because the court has stressed that the King's
Bench power is transcendent. For example, before the 1968
constitutional amendments were enacted, the court stated that:
Inherent in the Court of King's Bench was the power of general
superintendency over inferior tribunals, a power which was of
an ancient inception and recognized by the common law from
its very beginning. The jurisdiction of this court [of King's
Bench] is very high and transcendent. It keeps all inferior
jurisdictions within the bounds of their authority, and may
either remove their proceeding to be determined here, or
prohibit their progress below. 5
Thus, if the Legislature fails to express clearly its intention of
removing this power from the judiciary system, then the supreme
court may indeed return to the pre-1968 interpretation of King's
Bench and continue to invoke the power when it believes neces-
sary.
The court also views the power as an efficient use of judicial
resources. It has found that "[i]n order to conserve judicial
resources, speed the criminal trial in this case, and provide
guidance for the lower courts as to a question that is likely to recur,
[it will] assume jurisdiction of the case pursuant to [its] King's
Bench Powers."'  The supreme court has used the power to
43. Commonwealth v. Onada, 103 A.2d 90, 91 (Pa. 1954).
44. See August Hearing, supra note 6.
45. In re Bell, 152 A.2d 731, 734 (Pa. 1959) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *42).
46. Commonwealth v. Lang, 537 A.2d 1361, 1363-64 n.1 (Pa. 1988).
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protect innocent bystanders who are harmed by parties in litiga-
tion.47 It has stated that:
[T]he courts cannot and will not sit idly by while others who are
non-participants in the dispute essentially suffer the greatest
harm. In the wisdom of the framers of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, such incidents were anticipated so that the framers
provided that where a legal injury is sustained, there shall and
will always be access to the courts of this Commonwealth.4
Despite such a broad interpretation of the King's Bench
power, the court rarely exercises its authority for plenary jurisdic-
tion.49 In Carpentertown Coal & Coke v. Laird, the court stated:
The writ of prohibition is one which, like all other prerogative
writs, is to be used only with great caution and forbearance and
as an extraordinary remedy in cases of extreme necessity, to
secure order and regularity in judicial proceedings if none of the
ordinary remedies provided by law is applicable or adequate to
afford relief'
Indeed, several times the court has stressed the very limited
availability of this jurisdiction.51
B. The Legislature's View of the Power
The Legislature's and the public's perception of King's Bench
is that it is too vague, gives too much power to the judiciary, and
is inconsistent. The Legislature also is concerned with the court's
expansive power over other branches of government.52 During
the House Judiciary Committee hearings, Chairman Piccola stated:
The more the committee examines the operations of the
Supreme Court and its King's Bench power, the more I am
reminded of a street gang maintaining little or no rules. Most
troubling to me is how the Supreme Court operates in almost
lightning-strike fashion, when [sic] haphazard procedures that
undermine the credibility of the judiciary.
53
47. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
48. Masloff v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 613 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Pa. 1992).
49. See supra note 36.
50. Carpentertown Coal & Coke v. Laird, 61 A.2d 426, 430 (Pa. 1948).
51. See id
52. See generally March Hearing, supra note 5; August Hearing, supra note 6.
53. Inside the Capitol: Lawyer's Beef with Reform No Mystery, PATRIOT-NEWS
(Harrisburg), Aug. 10, 1995, at B4 (statement of Rep. Jeffrey E. Piccola).
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The recent case of Thermal Pure v. DER' serves as the perfect
platform for the House members to advocate a need for removal
of this power."
At the August Hearing before the House Judiciary Committee,
a resident who lives near the hazardous treatment plant testified
that when the case went before the supreme court for argument
under King's Bench, it was as if they, the residents, "had walked
in[to] the lions den., 56  The testimony was so compelling that it
was difficult, if not impossible, for legislators not to lend a
sympathetic ear to this constituent.57 Because of the need to
respond to the constituency in a highly political matter, legislators
are having a difficult time deciphering what this power is all about
and whether they need to limit it.
58
C. The Legal Profession's View of the Power
Despite court rules that outline when and how extraordinary
relief is available, the legal profession too is perplexed about how
this power works and how a petition for relief is granted.59
Lawyers want the power to remain but are in disagreement as to
how to curtail any potential abuses.' Some believe the Legisla-
ture should push for merit selection of judges.61  Others believe
the Legislature can limit any and all powers of the Pennsylvania
54. 63 E.D. Misc. Dkt. 1995 (Pa.). See also August Hearing, supra note 6; Chester
Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. DER, 668 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1995).
55. See August Hearing, supra note 6 (testimony of Rep. Jeffrey E. Piccola);
Pennsylvania Lawmakers Trash Court After Touring Thermal Pure Community, MED. WASTE
NEWS, Sept. 19, 1995 at 7. For background information on Thermal Pure v. DER, see
discussion infra Part III.
56. August Hearing, supra note 6, at 43 (testimony of Zulene Mayfield, Chair, Chester
Residents Concerned for Quality Living).
57. See August Hearing, supra note 6, at 53 (comments of Rep. James).
58. See id. at 92 (comments of Rep. Manderino).
59. See id. at 64 (testimony of Jerome Baiter, Esq.).
60. In an adversarial system what is considered an abuse for one side is considered a
welcome relief for the other side.
61. See Bridget E. Montgomery, Partisan Elections: The Albatross of Pennsylvania's
Judiciary, 98 DIcK. L. REV. 1 (1993); March Hearing, supra note 5, at 185 (testimony of
Barry L. Kauffman, Executive Director, Pa. Common Cause). This reform, however, does
not have enough support in the Pennsylvania Legislature to pass. In a recent Associated
Press survey of Pennsylvania lawmakers, fifty-eight percent opposed replacing judicial
elections with merit selection. Thirty-five percent supported merit selection. See Pamela
Sampson, Survey Shows Lawmakers Favor Court Reforms in Wake of Larsen Trial, AP
POLITICAL SERVIcE, Feb. 16, 1995, available in 1995 WL 6714669.
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courts.62 Yet others believe that a hybrid approach may be taken
by limiting King's Bench to cases that are in the Pennsylvania
courts." This hybrid approach would prevent the supreme court
from hearing a case that was before an administrative agency but
had not yet exhausted the appellate procedures within that
agency.64
III. The Call for a New Act
Several events happened within a short amount of time that
provoked the Legislature to introduce amendments eliminating the
King's Bench power from the supreme court.65 In August 1994,
Justice Rolf Larsen accused his colleague, Justice Zappala, of
favoritism and failing to follow the proper procedure for review.'
The Impeachment Committee, intrigued by Justice Larsen's
accusations, questioned Justice Zappala concerning the court's use
of the King's Bench or plenary jurisdiction in Masloff v. Port
Authority of Allegheny County6 7 and Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Board.' The Committee focused on the possibil-
ity that Justice Zappala was participating in ex parte proceedings
to aid the city of Pittsburgh, as the city's administration had
personal contacts within the court.69 Justice Zappala explained to
the Committee the procedure his chamber uses when accepting a
case under King's Bench and plenary jurisdiction; he assured no
favoritism was involved.7' While the Committee appeared to
accept Justice Zappala's rendition, the senators, representatives,
62. See August Hearing, supra note 6, at 141 (testimony of Bruce Ledewitz, Professor
of Law, Duquesne Univ.).
63. See March Hearing, supra note 5, at 28 (testimony of Jon LaFaver, Adjunct
Professor, The Dickinson School of Law).
64. See iU.
65. The other provisions in the bills are not new ideas. The Beck and Pomeroy
Commissions made many of these recommendations in the 1980s. See PHYLLIS W. BECK,
COMMITTEE TO STUDY PENNSYLVANIA'S UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYSTEM, PENNSYLVANIA'S
UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYSTEM: AN ANALYSIS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS (1988); THOMAS W.
POMEROY, JR., COMMITTEE TO STUDY PENNSYLVANIA'S UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYSTEM,
PENNSYLVANIA'S UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYSTEM: AN ANALYSIS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS
(1982).
66. See Impeachment Trial, supra note 3, at 274-75, 2183-98, 2259-74.
67. 613 A.2d 1186 (Pa. 1992).
68. 614 A.2d 213 (Pa. 1992).
69. See Impeachment Trial, supra note 3, at 2166-86.
70. See id. at 2165-67.
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and the public noted these acts to review when the dust settled
from the impeachment hearing.71
Meanwhile, the legal community was induced to question how
well the supreme court performs its duties in several law review
articles written by Professor Bruce Ledewitz72 and Judge Bernard
Scherer.73 Professor Ledewitz's article examined several areas
where the supreme court has over-exerted itself or where the court
failed to carry out its responsibilities.7 4 Many of his conclusions
were incorporated into House Bills 10 and 838. Judge Scherer
wrote an article specifically on the history of King's Bench in
Pennsylvania and concluded that the supreme court has exceeded
the historical power of King's Bench.75
Much of this debate would have escaped the public's interest
if it were not for two recent cases that came before the supreme
court under its plenary jurisdiction. In Thermal Pure v. DER,7 6
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to hear the case under
plenary jurisdiction and temporarily allowed a hazardous waste
company to continue operations until the court handed down a
decision.7 7 Residents, who believed the company was operating
an unsafe and unhealthy waste treatment plant in their community,
were furious.7" When a member of the community group testified
before the House Judiciary Committee, the House members seized
upon this case as a prime example of an abuse of power by the
supreme court.79 It is the only case, however, that the members
appear to focus on in the debate over whether to remove this
71. See March Hearing, supra note 5, at 4-7.
72. See Bruce Ledewitz, What's Really Wrong with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
32 Duo. L. REV. 409 (1994). Bruce S. Ledewitz is a Professor of Law at Duquesne
University. He appeared before the House Judiciary Committee twice in 1995 to testify
about judicial reform. See March Hearing, supra note 5, at 118; August Hearing, supra note
6, at 141.
73. See Bernard F. Scherer, The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the Origins of
King's Bench Power, 32 Duo. L. REV. 525 (1994). Judge Scherer currently sits on the
Common Pleas Court of Westmoreland County and was nominated by Governor Casey on
September 9, 1994 to fill the vacant slot of Justice Larsen on the supreme court until January
1996. His confirmation was never affirmed in the Senate. See Successor Chosen, READING
TIMES (Pa.), Sept. 10, 1994, at B4.
74. See Ledewitz, supra note 72.
75. See Scherer, supra note 73.
76. 63 E.D. Misc. Dkt. 1995 (Pa); see also Chester Residents Concerned for Quality
Living v. DER, 668 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1995).
77. See Chester Residents, 668 A.2d at 111.
78. See August Hearing, supra note 6, at 42-64 (testimony of Zulene Mayfield).
79. See id.
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power. The other case, School District of Wilkinsburg v. Wilkins-
burg Education Association,80 has been decided by the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court 1 and may add to this debate.'
Due to the above-stated events, the Pennsylvania House of
Representatives and Senate have introduced several bills aimed at
cleaning up the judicial branch. Revised' House Bill 10, House
Bill 838, and Senate Bill 334 4 have been re-introduced, and are
currently being reviewed and debated before the Legislature.1
5
The legislation, if enacted as originally introduced, would repeal the
80. 667 Al2d 5 (Pa. 1995) (No. 55 W.D. Appeal Docket 1995); see infra notes 115-24 and
accompanying text.
81. The decision was handed down on October 27, 1995. See School Dist. of
Wilkinsburg, 667 A.2d at 5.
82. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
83. Although the House was prepared to vote on the bills, its agenda was complicated
when the prime sponsor of the bills, Jeffrey E. Piccola, won a special election for the 15th
Senatorial District. See PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg), Nov. 3, 1996. As a result of this
election, the bills were tabled. On March 20, 1996, Senator Piccola re-introduced the bills
in the Senate as Senate Bill 1452 through Senate Bill 1458. On November 30, 1996, all
legislation that did not pass during that legislative session died. On February 28, 1997,
Senator Piccola along with six other senators introduced Senate Bill 578, an act "establishing
the United Judiciary Commission to study reform of the judiciary." Senate Bill No. 578,
Printer's No. 607 (Pa. 1997). The Commission is charged with the responsibility of studying
the King's Bench powers of the supreme court and preparing a report by June 30, 1998. See
id-
84. See infra note 88 and accompanying text. Senate Bill 334 also deals with judicial
reform; however, its language is not as extensive as House Bills 10 and 838. Therefore,
Senate Bill 334 is not considered to be the bill of choice for judicial reform.
85. House Bills 10 and 838 were introduced on February 14, 1995 by Rep. Piccola,
Chairperson of Judiciary Committee. The history of the bills .is as follows:
Referred to House Judiciary Committee - Feb. 14, 1995
House Judiciary Committee Public Hearing - Mar. 2, 1995
Reported as amended - May 23, 1995
First consideration - May 23, 1995
Laid on the table - May 23, 1995
Removed from the table - June 27, 1995
Re-referred to Appropriations - June 27, 1995
House Judiciary Committee Public Hearing - Aug. 3, 1995
86 co-sponsors
See 6 COMBINED HISTORY OF SENATE AND HOUSE BILLS, 179th Reg. Sess. (1995-1996)
(July 20, 1995).
It was anticipated that the bills would be voted on during the 1995-96 session.
Telephone Interview with Karen L. Dalton, Counsel, House Judiciary Committee (Sept. 15,
1995). However, Jeffrey E. Piccola's victory in the 15th Senatorial District prevented any
further action. See supra note 83.
If approved, the constitutional amendment must be approved again next session. From
there, the issue will go before the residents of the commonwealth for a referendum vote the
following election season. See PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
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Act of 1722 and empower the Legislature to determine the types
of cases the supreme court may hear under plenary jurisdiction. 6
The result could mean that the Legislature could prevent the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court from hearing certain cases.
7
IV. Problems With the Proposed New Act
If the Legislature ultimately enacts the legislation as originally
introduced," several areas would remain unresolved. The main
86. See infra note 88 (language of bill).
87. The majority of scholars agree that passage of House Bill 10 without House Bill 838
would allow the supreme court to declare the legislation unconstitutional as an intrusion into
the separation of powers. See March Hearing, supra note 5, at 122 (testimony of Bruce S.
Ledewitz).
There is judicial language suggesting that the King's Bench power is inherent in
the Court. Therefore, a constitutional amendment of the sort proposed may be
needed .... But whatever you do, you have to amend the Constitution and not
rely on the legislature's jurisdictional powers because you don't know what this
Court will say about their [sic] inherent power.
Id at 130.
88. House Bill 10 reads as follows:
Proposing amendment to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
establishing the Judicial Council of Pennsylvania and providing for its powers and
duties; rescinding the power of the Supreme Court to suspend statutes; providing
for the selection of the Chief Justice by the Governor and for the budgetary affairs
of the unified judicial system.
The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania hereby resolves as
follows:
Section 1. The following amendments to the Constitution of Pennsylvania are
proposed in accordance with Article XI:
(1) That sections 1, 2, 10, and 4-4 16 of Article V be amended to read:
§ 2. Supreme Court.
(a) The Supreme Court [(a)] shall be the highest court of the
Commonwealth [and in this court shall be reposed the supreme judicial
power of the Commonwealth;
(b)]. It shall consist of seven justices, one of whom shall be the
Chief Justice[;] and
[(c)] shall have such jurisdiction as shall be provided by law.
(d) The EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY STATUTE, THE
Supreme Court shall not have King's Bench power.
HB 10, supra note 9.
House Bill 838 reads as follows:
Amending Title 42 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure) of the Pennsylvania
Consolidated Statutes, providing for the Judicial Council of Pennsylvania.
The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania hereby enacts as
follows:
Section 4. Sections 501 and 502 of Title 42 are amended to read:
§ 501. Supreme Court.
(b) Certain powers rescinded. - -A& EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY
STATUTE, THE Supreme Court shall not have King's Bench power.
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problem with the original drafts is that the bills do not clearly
define the responsibilities of the court. House Bill 838 requires the
Legislature to provide a list of areas where the supreme court can
exercise the King's Bench power.89 However, the original legisla-
tion provides no such list, which means that the power cannot be
used at all, effectively destroying King's Bench. Even if an
amendment is introduced and a laundry list is provided, a case is
certain to fall between the cracks and elude consideration.
90
Additionally, the original legislation does not provide a time
in which the supreme court must hand down a decision in the
stipulated cases. House Bill 838 does not allow the supreme court
to intercede immediately when the lower courts need assistance in
interpreting legislation; following the regular appeals process will
mean delays and inconsistencies for citizens of the commonwealth.
Furthermore, House Bill 838 does not afford sufficient guidance to
those permitted to petition for the use of the power. Perhaps the
most troubling aspect of the legislation as originally introduced,
however, is that it does not fulfill one of the original goals-the
restoration of the public's faith in the Pennsylvania judicial system.
§ 502. General powers of Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court shall have and exercise the powers vested in it by the
Constitution of Pennsylvania [, including the power generally to minister
justice to all persons and to exercise the powers of the court, as fully and
amply, to all intents and purposes, as the justices of the Court of King's
Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer, at Westminster, or any of them, could
or might do on May 22, 1722. The Supreme Court shall also have and
exercise the following powers:
(1) All powers necessary or appropriate in aid of its original and
appellate jurisdiction which are agreeable to the usages and principles
of law.
(2) The] and powers vested in it by statute, including the provisions of
this title.
HB 838, supra note 10.
89. See HB 838, supra note 10, § 501(b).
90. Incidentally, delegates at the 1968 Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention discussed
why listing all the powers of the King's Bench was a bad idea. Namely, no one was capable
of doing it! Delegate Woodside commented:
I doubt whether any justice of the Supreme Court or any lawyer in Pennsylvania
could sit down and be sure that he has accurately spelled out in complete detail
all of the powers of the King's Bench and all of the legislative powers and all of
the old constitutional powers that now exist in the Supreme Court. We [the
Constitutional Judicial Committee] did not feel capable of doing it. I do not think
anybody is capable of doing it, and that is why we did not do it.
DEBATES, supra note 27, at 844.
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In fact, it could have the opposite effect, preventing access to
Pennsylvania's highest court when most necessary.
This power has been used for many valid purposes and truly
acts as "a safety valve to protect the public."'" Without this
power, the public interest would suffer in many ways. A number
of examples will illustrate how this power has helped Pennsylvania
citizens in every walk of life.
A. Voting Rights Not Protected
Without the supreme court's ability to hear cases under
plenary jurisdiction, voting rights could be frustrated at election
time by either delay or confusion. For example, in 1990, Pennsyl-
vania's congressional seats were reduced from twenty-three to
twenty-one due to the decline in population as reported by the
United States Census Bureau.92 This reduction required the
commonwealth to remap its congressional districts.93 In 1992,
when the period for circulating the nomination petitions had
already begun, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court received the
reapportionment suit.94
The normal course of litigation95 would have made a timely
congressional primary impossible.96 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court came to the Pennsylvania voters' rescue, however, by taking
immediate jurisdiction on February 13, 1992. The supreme court
designated the commonwealth court to act as hearing master, to
receive evidence, and to recommend the twenty-one new dis-
tricts.97 Eleven days later, on February 24, 1992, the common-
wealth court filed a redistricting plan. The supreme court, after a
scheduled argument, adopted the plan on March 26, 1992.98 This
allowed the primary election to continue in almost normal fashion.
Other elections, both primaries and fall elections, have been
91. August Hearing, supra note 6, at 17, 109.
92. See Mellow v. Mitchell, 607 A.2d 204, 205 (Pa. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 828
(1992).
93. See id. at 205.
94. See id.
95. The normal litigation process would be: trial in the commonwealth court, post-trial
motions, briefing, argument, decision in that court, appeal, briefing of the appeal and
argument.
96. The last day to file nomination petitions for the May 1992 primary election was
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reviewed by the supreme court in a timely fashion to insure that
the public has adequate representation at all times.99
B. Public Projects Would Be Lost
In the longest preliminary injunction hearing in the common-
wealth's history, a group sued to enjoin the Early Action Program
of the Allegheny County Port Authority, which involved a
proposed express busway and a rapid "Skybus" transit system.
100
The trial court agreed with the dissident group and granted the
injunction. 10' Because of this decision, the county was to lose
proffered federal subsidy money to another state.1°2 The supreme
court accepted the case under plenary jurisdiction, thereby omitting
the commonwealth court's review."c Within a few months, the
supreme court vacated the injunction and allowed the transit
system to be built."°
C. Health, Safety & Welfare of Pennsylvanians Would Not Be
Properly Attended
One of the cases on which the Larsen Impeachment hearings
focused was Masloff v. Port Authority of Allegheny County.15
There, the city had reached an impasse with the workers' union'06
and sued in equity to enjoin the strike." Simultaneously, the city
filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief with the supreme court
under title 42, section 726 of Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes
Annotated."° The court assumed jurisdiction and remanded the
matter to commonwealth court for expedited disposition. 9
The strike had caused a clear and present danger to citizens of
the Pittsburgh area.' Testimony indicated that the strike had a
99. See Thiemann v. Allen, 402 A.2d 1348 (Pa. 1979), overruled sub nor. Mezvinsky v.
Davis, 459 A.2d 307 (Pa. 1983); McCabe v. Lehrer, 439 A.2d 1147 (Pa. 1981).
100. See Flaherty v. Allegheny County Port Auth., 299 A.2d 613, 616 (Pa. 1973).
101. See id. at 615.
102. See i. at 618.
103. See id. at 615-16.
104. See id at 613.
105. 613 A.2d 1186 (Pa. 1992).
106. Some 2,700 individual employees of PAT comprised the union, Local 85. See iU at
1187.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 1188.
109. See id.
110. See Masloff, 613 A.2d at 1188.
1997]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
far-reaching effect upon the commercial, academic, medical, and
social institutions of western Pennsylvania."' For example,
patients were unable to get to the appropriate medical facilities for
treatment."' Evidence established that:
Emergency medical services were delayed in attempts to reach
citizens in need. Citizens [were] endangering their safety by
walking along public roads to get to work because other modes
of transportation [were] unavailable. Residents [had] been
forced to find alternate living accommodations with friends or
family because of the inaccessibility to work, school or day
care.
113
The supreme court permanently enjoined the work stoppage and
the city returned to normal while the parties resolved the underly-
ing issues through the courts.1
4
More recently, in School District of Wilkinsburg v. Wilkins-
burg Education Association,"' the supreme court accepted a
petition under plenary jurisdiction to determine the legality of
contracting with a for-profit entity to run a school. 116 The parties
had tried to work out their differences in common pleas court;
however, the beginning of the school year was quickly approach-
ing.1"7 Judge Freedman of the Court of Common Pleas of Alleg-
heny County enjoined the school board's decision to hire a private
contractor without a hearing.18  Commonwealth court affirmed
the lower court ruling"9 and the school board filed a petition for
the supreme court to accept the petition under plenary jurisdic-
tion."2° The lower court continued to hold the school board in
contempt for implementing the program it had enjoined.'2'
Without the supreme court hearing this issue, school would not
111. See id.
112. See id at 1191.
113. Id
114. See id at 1192.
115. No. 102 W.D. Misc. Dkt 1995 (Pa.).
116. See id
117. See id.
118. See School Dist. of Wilkinsburg v. Wilkinsburg Educ. Ass'n, No. GD95-05174, Civil
Division (Pa. Ct. of C.P. of Allegheny County).
119. See School Dist. of Wilkinsburg v. Wilkinsburg Educ. Ass'n, 661 A.2d 947 (Pa.
Conmw. Ct. 1995)(No. 1032 C.D. 1995).
120. See School Dist. of Wilkinsburg v. Wilkinsburg Educ. Ass'n, No. 98 W.D. Misc. Dkt.
1995 (Pa).
121. See School Dist. of Wilkinsburg, No. GD95-05174.
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have started on time. 2  The court ultimately heard both the
contempt order and the legal issue under plenary jurisdiction.
123
Because the supreme court assumed jurisdiction of this case,
students began the school year under private contractors while the
legal issues were defined in court. 24
D. Inconsistent Interpretation of Newly Enacted Legislation
Would Result
The supreme court has used the King's Bench power to resolve
speedily any unconscionable or inconsistent provisions in newly
enacted legislation. For example, in Mattos v. Thompson,"2 the
supreme court assumed plenary jurisdiction to decide the constitu-
tionality of a section of the Health Care Services Malpractice
Act.126  This act gave health care arbitration panels original
exclusive jurisdiction over medical malpractice claims.' The
supreme court found the delays in processing claims proscribed
under the Act oppressive"2 and impermissibly infringed on a
person's constitutional right to a jury.29 The delays were found
to be unconscionable, to rip the fabric of public confidence in the
efficiency and effectiveness of our judicial system irreparably, and
incapable of achieving the stated purpose of the legislative
scheme." °
In Commonwealth v. Lutz,' plenary power was used to
resolve nine lower courts' views over the legislative enactment of
the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition ("ARD") created by the
122. See Brief for petitioner at 10, School Dist. of Wilkinsburg v. Wilkinsburg Educ.
Ass'n, No. 98 W.D. Misc. Dkt. 1995 (Pa.).
123. See School Dist. of Wilkinsburg v. Wilkinsburg Educ. Ass'n, 667 A.2d 5 (Pa. 1995).
124. See Landmark Ruling Allows Turner Initiative To Proceed, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 25,
1995, available in WESTLAW, News Library, ALLNEWSPLUS File.
125. 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980).
126. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.101 (West 1992).
127. See Mattos, 421 A.2d at 191.
128. Between April 6, 1976 and December 31, 1979, a total of 2,909 claims were filed
with the Administrator under the Act. Of those 2,909 claims, 134 cases were given a
certificate of readiness; of those 134, 14 were tried before an arbitration panel, 23 were
settled during panel selection, one was continued by order of commonwealth court and 96
had no final disposition. The amount in controversy in many of these cases exceeded
$10,000. See id at 194.
129. See id. at 196.
130. See id. at 195.
131. 495 A.2d 928 (Pa. 1985).
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Motor Vehicle Code for drunk driving cases. 32  Lower courts
were unsure how to interpret the newly enacted statute and
attorneys for the commonwealth refused to allow the defendants'
admissions into the ARD programs.'33 The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court ultimately held that the ARD program was a privilege
which the Attorney General had to control-not the defen-
dants.134
In Bacchettav. Bacchetta35 the supreme court used plenary
power to interpret the Divorce Code. 136  The court provided
guidance to the lower courts concerning the Code and the Legisla-
ture's intent in the newly enacted legislation regarding the
distribution of property. 37  The supreme court's guidance
provided for prompt and consistent interpretation of the Code for
all citizens of the commonwealth involved in divorce proceedings.
E. Constitutional Rights That Affect a Large Body of People
Would Not Be Addressed Immediately
Oftentimes, the courts are faced with constitutional challenges
that have far-reaching implications for more people than the
immediate petitioners. The supreme court has used the King's
Bench power to address pressing constitutional issues. For
example, the supreme court assumed plenary jurisdiction in
Pittsburgh Coming Corporation v. Bradley'38 to determine the
most efficient disposition of asbestos cases without unfairly
depriving litigants of the opportunity to obtain full and fair
adjudication of their rights.'39 At the time, the Philadelphia court
system was third highest in the nation with respect to the number
of cases received relating to asbestos."4 The Philadelphia court
system, in an effort to provide efficient and fair hearings to the
litigants, issued a court rule calling for a separate court docket with
a separately appointed asbestos judge.4 When the cases slowed
132. See i&t at 931.
133. See id. at 930.
134. See i&t at 936.
135. 445 A.2d 1194 (Pa. 1982).
136. See id. at 1195.
137. See id. at 1195-98.
138. 453 A.2d 314 (Pa. 1982).
139. See id. at 315.
140. At the time of this case, 1,850 cases were pending and an average of 75 a month
were being filed. See id.
141. See id
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due to the jury system, the court of common pleas issued another
rule instituting trial by judge.142 Then, following the completion
of the matter, any party could demand a de novo trial by jury.43
Pittsburgh Coming, a defendant in the asbestos cases, believed
that the procedure violated its constitutional right to a jury
trial.'" The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, found that
the lower court had provided the option to seek a jury trial after
the trial judge had ruled. 4 In the interest of efficiency and
justice to all parties, the supreme court affirmed the lower court's
procedural regulations, allowing the litigation to proceed in a more
efficient manner.1'
In Jackson v. Hendrick47 both parties requested the supreme
court to assume plenary jurisdiction and determine the proper
standard when judging whether overcrowding of prison inmates
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.'" The lower
courts had consistently held that the best way to deal with the
inhumane conditions in prisons was to institute a "one man, one
cell" requirement. 49 This rule was not acceptable to the prison-
ers, who were concerned it would lead to solitary confinement."
The taxpayers were not happy with this rule either. For them, it
meant either more money would be spent on new prisons or the
court would order prisoners released.'' Because of the potential
cost and safety issues, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted
the case under plenary jurisdiction to provide the acceptable test
for the lower courts to use.12 Once the test was provided, the
lower courts and the litigants had the necessary tools to achieve a
fair result. 3
142. See id.
143. See Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 453 A.2d at 315.
144. See id at 316.
145. See id.
146. See id
147. 503 A.2d 400 (Pa. 1986).
148. See id. at 401
149. Id. at 402.
150. See id.
151. See id.




E Freedom of the Press Versus an Accused's Trial Rights Could
Not Be Timely Addressed
The supreme court accepted plenary jurisdiction in Common-
wealth v. Hayes"5 to determine whether the rights to free press
and fair trial could be balanced. In this case, an elected state
official was charged with sexually assaulting and supplying drugs to
a seventeen year-old male high school student. 5 The trial court
granted the defendant's motion to close the hearing to the public
and the press.15 6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed the
case and reminded the lower courts that closure may not be
ordered where another available procedural device, such as
sequestration, could fully protect the defendant's right.'57 The
public had a right to gain access to the criminal proceedings, and
the court system would not be adversely affected by implementing
those procedural alternatives.' If the supreme court had not
been able to review this case under plenary jurisdiction, the public's
right to observe the trial would have been compromised. 9
G. Errors By Lower Judicial Tribunals Could Not Be Reviewed
Cases have existed in which lower judicial actions left the
parties with no right to appeal. In a proceeding where members of
the Pittsburgh Police Department were dismissed and the Civil
Service Commission had affirmed their dismissal, no statutory
jurisdiction was granted to the superior court to entertain an
appeal.' 6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, was able
to hear the appeal under King's Bench. 16' The supreme court
explained that King's Bench was a necessary power granted only to
it. 62 However, when it took a case under this auspice, it would
not "weigh the evidence nor in other respects substitute [its]
154. 414 A.2d 318 (Pa. 1980).
155. See id. at 318.
156. See id. at 318-19.
157. See id. at 327.
158. See id.
159. See Hayes, 414 A.2d at 327.
160. See In re Petition of Bell, 152 A.2d 731 (Pa. 1959).
161. See id. at 733.
162. The court stated that "inherent in the Court of King's Bench was the power of
general superintendency over inferior tribunals .... It keeps all inferior jurisdictions within
the bounds of their authority." Id. at 734.
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discretion for that of the court below."'" The only exception to
this rule would be when the lower court abused its discretion or
there was an error of law."6
The supreme court has also used the King's Bench power to
review a lower court's inappropriate behavior in criminal trials. In
Commonwealth v. Chimenti,1 6 the superior court entertained a
plea bargain after the entry of a judgment of a sentence.' 66 A
defendant, who was convicted of first degree murder, was able to
obtain a plea bargain agreement of no higher than third degree
murder from the superior court judge.167 The supreme court saw
this as an over-extension of authority by the superior court judge;
therefore, it vacated the superior court's order and remanded the
case for a proper appeal. t6s
H. A Sound Criteria for Using the Plenary Jurisdiction Already
Exists
The treatise for appellate practice in Pennsylvania 69 has
stated that the supreme court has a loose formula or standard
whereby cases will be considered for review under the plenary
jurisdiction.17 First, while "[t]he presence of an issue of immedi-
ate public importance is not alone sufficient to justify extraordinary
relief. ,,,17 it plays a prominent role in the factoring pro-
cess.1 72  As seen in the previous section, election cases, strikes,
and education are some of the cases that have often presented the
need for swift decisions.173 Otherwise, the citizens are without
government representation, can be at risk in not being able to
163. Id. at 740.
164. See id
165. 507 A.2d 79 (Pa. 1986).
166. See id at 80.
167. See id
168. See id. at 83.
169. G. RONALD DARLINGTON ET AL., PENNSYLVANIA APPELLATE PRACrIcE §§ 10:22-
23 (2d ed. 1994).
170. See id.
171. Philadelphia Newspapers v. Jerome, 387 A.2d 425, 430 n.11 (Pa. 1978), appeal
dismissed, 443 U.S. 913 (1979).
172. In Masloff v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 613 A.2d 1186 (Pa. 1992), the
"[h]earing demonstrated that the strike created a clear and present danger and a threat to
the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens." Id. at 1188. "Public services, such as
ambulance, fire and police services, were severely hampered by the increased traffic
congestion resulting from the strike." Id. at 1191.
173. See supra discussion Part IV.
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receive medical attention, or can be deprived a quality education.
The court also has intervened under plenary jurisdiction to help
decipher the necessary procedure to elect lower court judges.174
This action eliminated election day delay and confusion. 75
The court also appears to look for some sort of direct or
indirect impact on the judicial system. 7 6 Often, a constitutional
question is involved or a criminal issue of great importance when
the power is invoked."
Cases that involve issues of constitutionality and the criminal
justice system have gone directly to the supreme court for review
because prompt and final resolutions were needed. "Where a
constitutional question is so momentous that it is bound to go all
the way to the supreme court, there is no point in going through
intermediate reviews."" Interestingly, in those states which do
not have an intermediate appellate court, all cases are reviewed
directly and solely by the highest court.79
The Pennsylvania Constitution vested "the judicial power of
the Commonwealth in a unified judicial system" x  and reposes
"the supreme judicial power" in the supreme court. 1' The
framers of the constitution recognized that each branch of govern-
ment must have a responsible head. Thus, the supreme court has
correctly taken direct jurisdiction of issues affecting the court
system. The lower courts could not decide some of these issues
and, therefore, left the supreme court with no alternative but to
decide the case."t
174. See Thiemann v. Allen, 402 A.2d 1348, 1349 (Pa. 1979), overruled sub nom.
Mezvinsky v. Davis, 459 A.2d 307 (Pa. 1983).
175. See August Hearing, supra note 6, at 100 (testimony of Hon. David Craig, Former
President Judge, Pa. Commw. Ct.).
176. See Commonwealth v. Lutz, 495 A.2d 928 (Pa. 1985).
177. See supra notes 138-59 and accompanying text.
178. See August Hearing, supra note 6, at 95 (testimony of Hon. David Craig).
179. See Thomas B. Marvell, The Effectiveness of Flexible Assignments of Appeals
between Supreme and Intermediate Courts, 78 JUDICATURE 292 (1995)
180. PA. CONST. art. V, § 1.
181. Id. § 2.
182. See In re Determination of Priority of Comm'n Among Certain Judges of the Super.
Ct. and Commw. Ct., 427 A.2d 153 (Pa. 1981)(deciding whether appointive service could be
counted in determining seniority among elected judges); Beckert v. Warren, 439 A.2d 638
(Pa. 1981) (deciding whether court of common pleas' budgetary request was valid); Snyder
v. Snyder, 620 A.2d 1133 (Pa. 1993) (deciding whether county court judge required county
funds for judicial staff in the administration of justice); Lavelle v. Koch, 617 A.2d 319 (Pa.
1992); Caroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1971).
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When a party is convinced that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has decided the case incorrectly, it may appeal to the United
States Supreme Court. In fact, this has been done with many of
the cases that were decided under plenary jurisdiction; however, the
United States Supreme Court has denied every appeal for certio-
rari.83
V. Other States' Judicial Systems-Are They Better?
In ten other states that have intermediate appeals courts, the
highest court exercises unconstrained control over every appeal
taken from the trial courts or agencies.'84  In six of those
states,'85 all appeals are filed with the supreme court. The
supreme court then selectively chooses and transfers the remaining
cases to the intermediate appellate level.8 6 The other four states
require the appeal to be filed with the intermediate court."
However, the high court still picks the cases it wants to hear and
leaves the remaining cases for the intermediate court.' 88
Legal scholars believe that neither of these systems effectively
uses the highest court's discretion to hear cases.' 89 First, lawyers
trying cases have no clear guidance as to which cases will be heard.
Second, justices have no exact formula to decide what case to
accept. Third, the system, at times, does not work as efficiently as
need be.
Pennsylvania, however, has the opportunity to hear emergency
cases swiftly in its supreme court with consistency in the routing of
appeals. Lawyers are given clear instructions"9 on how and
where to file petitions for extraordinary relief. 9' Once the
petition is filed, a lawyer knows where the petition is and waits to
learn whether it will be accepted. Then, when the petition is
accepted, each lawyer can argue on the merits. Finally, it is noted
that parties rarely oppose having the supreme court take plenary
183. See August Hearing, supra note 6, at 124-25 (testimony of Hon. David Craig).
184. See Marvell, supra note 179, at 293.
185. The six states are: Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Utah. See
id.
186. See id.
187. The four states are: Connecticut, Kansas, Massachusetts, and Nebraska. See id.
188. See id.
189. See August Hearing, supra note 6, at 108-10.
190. See PA. R. APP. P. 3309.
191. See DARLINGTON, supra note 169, § 3309 (appendix) (providing a sample form).
1997]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:4
jurisdiction' 92 and often welcome the swiftness and finality of the
decision.1 93 Likewise, the clients often see this as a less costly
alternative in reaching a final decision that legally binds all
parties.'94
VI. Options Available to the Court to Improve Our Current
System
The hearings from the House Judiciary Committee provided
great insight into the advantages and disadvantages of the King's
Bench power. Almost unanimously,'95 both those who seek
aggressive judicial reforms and those who are avid guardians of our
judicial system agree that a complete dismissal of this power would
not be good for Pennsylvania. 96 However, several recommenda-
tions could make our system better, more efficient, and perhaps
even lessen the opportunity for the public to see the appearance of
judicial impropriety.
First, the supreme court should be commended for amending
its rules' 97 to require the petitions to be filed with the prothonot-
192. See August Hearing, supra note 6, at 60, 91.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. Even the Chester residents involved in Thermal Pure testified that there is a need
for the King's Bench power. Zulene Mayfield testified that "[i]f there is a case where it's
life and death, then I would say that we should have King's Bench." August Hearing, supra
note 6, at 60. Mr. Baiter, lawyer for the Concerned Citizens of Chester, stated: "I can
appreciate a need for something like the King's Bench. There comes in all societies certain
crises in which there is need for quick decision making. Therefore I don't have an objection
philosophically." Id. at 91.
196. "If the problem is not so much the existence of the power as its application in a few
unfortunate instances, then perhaps the problem would be better addressed in other ways."
March Hearing, supra note 5, at 91 (testimony of Hon. Robert L. Byer for the American
Judicature Society).
"[T']he Legislature should keep foremost in mind the traditional constitutional balance
of power between the branches of government .... [T]here is a fine line between fixing the
perceived ills of the judiciary and usurping its constitutional role. Quick fixes.., are not
recommended." Id. at 10 (testimony of Paul L. Stevens, Esq., President, Pa. Bar Ass'n).
197. The supreme court in 1994 promulgated internal operating procedures which require
petitions, including petitions for extraordinary relief under the King's Bench power, to
originate in the prothonotary's office. See PENNSYLVANIA RULEs OF COURT, Internal
Operating Procedures of the Supreme Court, 662 (West 1997) (Motions, Miscellaneous
Petitions and Applications for Relief).
The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provide a five paragraph rule on how
one is to file a petition for extraordinary jurisdiction, the right of the opponent or those
interested in filing an answer, the requirement of service upon interested parties, provisions
for the circulation of the petitions through the entire court, and vote. See PA. R. APP. P.
3309.
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ary's office and not with the individual justices.'98 The ability to
petition an individual justice was of great concern during the
Larsen hearing.' 9 This new rule will assist the court in establish-
ing credibility with the public.
Second, upon accepting a case under King's Bench, the
supreme court should attempt not to act as a fact finder. In the
event it does act as a fact finder, however, the supreme court
should produce some type of trial record. This is a matter of deep
concern to the opponents in Thermal Pure."
Third, many have advocated for a more definite time frame for
the court to issue an opinion under plenary jurisdiction."° Again,
this issue was a concern to the Impeachment Committee and to
those residents of Chester living with potentially unsafe condi-
tions.' In Thermal Pure, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court heard
argument in April 1995' and seven months later a decision was
finally handed down.' Some people presenting testimony to the
House Judiciary Committee suggested that the time it took the
supreme court to issue an opinion in the Thermal Pure2 5 case is
not that important, because the case normally would not have
reached the supreme court in such a quick fashion." Therefore,
to have the ultimate decision in the case take a few months longer
198. Court rules were amended by the supreme court as a result of the impeachment
trial. See Pamela Sampson, State's Top Court to Improve Procedures-Recent Changes Focus
on Justice's Accountability, PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg), Oct. 13, 1994, at Al.
199. See Impeachment Trial, supra note 3, at 2156-66, 2173, 2183-84, 2260-61.
200. "Imagine further that there is no transcript and there is no appeal if the Supreme
Court rules against you." Piccola, supra note 7, at A15; see also August Hearing, supra note
6, at 84 (testimony of Jerome Baiter, Esq.).
201. See August Hearing, supra note 6, at 19-24; see also Impeachment Trial, supra note
3, at 2192-93.
202. See August Hearing, supra note 6, at 42-94 (testimony of Zulene Mayfield and
Jerome Baiter, Esq.).
203. See id. at 70.
204. An opinion for the appeal heard under allocatur was issued on November 22, 1995.
In a footnote to the opinion, the supreme court acknowledged it had not yet taken action
under its plenary jurisdiction to decide the validity of DER's Cease and Desist Order.
However, this opinion made that decision moot. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality
Living v. Commonwealth, 668 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1995) (appeal of Thermal Pure). See also Court
OKs Treatment Plant, SENTINEL (Carlisle), Nov. 24, 1995, at A2; Ruling Clears Way for
Treatment Plant, TiMES (Reading), Nov. 24, 1995, at B7.
205. Thermal Pure v. DER, 63 E.D. Misc. Dkt. 1995 (Pa.). See also Chester Residents
Concerned for Quality Living v. DER, 668 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1995).
206. See August Hearing, supra note 6, at 20 (testimony of Zygmont Pines).
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than either side would like is really not an issue.2°7 Nonetheless,
the court should review its system to determine whether it can
more efficiently write opinions and resolve issues for the public.
After all, matters taken under this power are supposedly emergency
in nature.
Fourth, the supreme court, while having the prerogative to
overturn any lower court's decision, should consider instituting a
policy regarding injunctions issued by a lower court or agency.
When a watch dog agency, such as the Department of Environ-
mental Protection, has issued a Cease and Desist Order, as they did
in Thermal Pure,' the health and well-being of our residents
must be upheld.' 9 When a decision is not to be forthcoming,
then the court should respect the lower court's findings until a final
decision is handed down.
Fifth, rules are needed concerning former supreme court
justices lobbying before the court on behalf of their clients.21°
207. It should be noted that the court already has internal rules regarding time frames
for hearing cases. Rule VI(B) states:
Disposition. The Chief Justice will prepare memorand[a] setting forth the
position[s] of the parties and a recommended disposition. Vote proposals shall be
circulated within [thirty] days from the date of [the] assignment, and shall contain
a proposed disposition date no greater than [thirty] days from the date of
circulation. A vote of [the] majority of those participating is required to
implement the proposed disposition.
Every motion shall be decided within [sixty] days. Orders disposing of motions
shall include the names of any justices who did not participate in the consideration
or decision of the matter. Procedural motions, e.g., requests for extension of time,
requests to exceed page limits and to proceed in forma pauperis, are to be
disposed of by the prothonotary's office after screening by the deputy prothonot-
ary.
August Hearing, supra note 6, at 40-41; see also PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF COURT, Internal
Operating Procedures of the Supreme Court, 662 (West 1997) (Motions, Miscellaneous
Petitions and Applications for Relief)
Zygmont Pines believes that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court met the requirements
of this rule in Thermal Pure. The petition for plenary review was filed in March and the
court granted the petition in April, within 30 days. See id. at 41. The rules do not appear
to dictate a time limit on the court providing a final opinion on the matter, however.
208. Thermal Pure v. DER, 63 E.D. Misc. Dkt. 1995 (Pa.). See also Chester Residents,
668 A.2d at 110.
209. Mr. Baiter believes that if the court had overruled the commonwealth court's
decision, the result would have been acceptable and "normal" under King's Bench.
However, he believes overruling an administrative agency's determination without a hearing
is stretching the power and, therefore, unacceptable. See August Hearing, supra note 6, at
94.
210. The lawyer for the company in Thermal Pure, Mr. Kauffman, is a former
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice. Rumors circulated that the reason the supreme court
accepted this case was because this former justice made personal contact with some of his
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This rule could be similar to the United States Supreme Court's
rule, which prohibits "any person after leaving employment [of the
Court from] participat[ing] in any professional capacity in any case
pending before th[e] Court ... until two years have elapsed after
separation."2"' The other option is for the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court to adopt additional ethics rules like the Legislature has
imposed on itself.212
Sixth, it has been recommended that the supreme court should
not interfere with an agency decision until it is in the court
system.213  However, this would conflict with the Beck and
Pomeroy Commission reports, which recommended that the
supreme court have jurisdiction over agency tribunals as well to
make for a unified judicial system.214
Finally, the Legislature, if it truly wants to help improve the
supreme court and the appearance of our justices, must seriously
consider adopting a merit based system for choosing justices. Then,
in the confirmation process, the Legislature could make sure that
nominees have a thorough understanding of the boundaries of the
supreme court and the use of the King's Bench power. Many
advocates, testifying both for and against King's Bench, recognize
the inherent fault of this system in the election process.
21
VI. Conclusion
The Legislature's belief that the language found in House Bills
10 and 838 will restore the public's faith in the judicial system is
former colleagues on the bench. Mr. Kauffman has denied these rumors. See August
Hearing, supra note 6, at 81.
211. U.S. Sup. Cr. R. 7.
212. See 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 403 (1997) (restricted activities for public officers).
Subsection (g) states that "[n]o former public official or public employee shall represent a
person, with promised or actual compensation, on any matter before the governmental body
with which he has been associated for one year after he leaves that body." Id.
213. Jon LaFaver testified before the House Judiciary Committee that "it would be
possible to restrict the power of the Supreme Court to issue writs of prohibition, which was
one of the King's Bench power, to say only constitutionally created courts, and thereby
eliminating the exercise of that power from other commissions and quasi-judicial bodies,
without eliminating entirely the other historical powers of King's Bench." March Hearing,
supra note 5, at 28.
214. See PHYLLIS BECK, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S JUDICIAL REFORM COMMISSION
(1988).
215. "If we make major improvements in the way we select our judges, the need for
other reforms probably diminishes." March Hearing, supra note 5, at 186 (testimony of




incorrect. In fact, if King's Bench is eliminated, the Pennsylvania
court system will not be able to efficiently address matters of
urgency.216 Many have warned the legislators against "throw[ing]
the baby out with the bath water. 2 t7  This phrase sums up what
could be the ultimate effect in our judicial system if passage of the
legislation ensues. 2"8 Removal of this power will prevent cases
important to Pennsylvania citizens from being heard expeditiously,
perhaps from ever being heard at all. The interference by the
Legislature into the judicial branch's handling of justice likely will
be considered unconstitutional by the supreme court219 and a
constitutional amendment must be passed in order for the court to
accept the Legislature's instructions.2'
The Legislature and the people of Pennsylvania should not
attempt to fix what is not broken. This power has existed for more
than two hundred years and has provided efficient and necessary
judicial review at crucial times in the state's history. It has
provided necessary relief to the citizenry. There are no complaints
from the legal profession concerning the use of the power, except
perhaps from the losing side.
While the supreme court can amend its rules to make for a
more clear and efficient power, the best thing the Legislature can
do to help create a better judicial system is to move toward the
216. Judge Spaeth testified:
The problem with the judicial system in the public's eyes is that appellate judges
are selected only after a process that demeans the system, discourages confidence
in it. It's mired and money raising from those who practice before the Court.
These bills would do nothing about that. That's the root of judicial reform.
March Hearing, supra note 5, at 57.
217. August Hearing, supra note 6, at 95 (testimony of Hon. David Craig).
218. Mr. Ronca, in his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, stated the
following:
Our concern, I think, is that in reaction to what happened to the Supreme Court
over the past few years, the legislature might overreact in trying to control, or
amend or lessen the powers of the judicial branch, which could have one of two
effects. It could lessen the effectiveness of the Supreme Court to act as the
arbitrator for what is constitutional and what is not unconstitutional. And it also
could create a constitutional crisis, I think, wherever the Court may try to exercise
powers that aren't there. I think we have to look beyond what has happened in
the past few years and try to also keep an eye toward what the Supreme Court
might be trying to do in the future years .... [W]ith respect to the King's Bench,
there are times when that suspension or the exercise of those powers is very useful
and very proper.
March Hearing, supra note 5, at 78.
219. See discussion supra Part II.A.
220. See PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
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merit selection of judges. The people of the commonwealth,
meanwhile, need to become better informed as to the candidates
for the supreme court seats. A hasty move by the Legislature or
the public at this juncture could ultimately backfire when the
citizens of the commonwealth need access to the court the most.
Alexandra Makosky

